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Abstract
Herein we further explore whether the power of arbitrage to induce people to exhibit 
more rational behavior extends to diverse decision-making tasks and stated valuation 
over preferences for gambles. We examine how arbitrage in a preference reversal setting 
affects behavior for the valuation of low probability food safety risks, the Allais Paradox, 
and the Ellsberg paradox. We design a three-stage experiment that elicits choices and 
values over gambles, with and without the experience of arbitrage. Our results suggest 
that a rationality crossover can exist – arbitrage in one setting can cross-over to affect 
the choices in unrelated tasks. Stated values for safer food dropped by 20–50%, and the 
frequency of the Allais paradox is cut in half. People acted more rationally by reducing 
their stated value for a lottery, or if monetary adjustments are impossible they adjust 
their choice away from the lottery. Rationality crossovers have their predicted limits in 
that the frequency of the Ellsberg para-dox, the most distinct decision environment, 
remained the same. We also found that the form of arbitrage as captured by stricter real 
market-like experience or a weaker version of cheap-talk (i.e., hypothetical) arbitrage did 
not affect the results. This paper shows that arbitrage-induced rationality can transfer 
across contexts.
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1. Introduction
For 50 years now laboratory evidence has revealed that people acting outside the realm
of marketlike discipline can exhibit behavior inconsistent with rational choice theory. Such
anomalous behavior undercuts the classic and still popular expected utility model of deci-
sion-making and the non-market valuation methods used to evaluate private choice and
public policies regarding environmental resources. Landmark examples of anomalistic
behavior include the well-documented phenomena of the Allais paradox, the Ellsberg par-
adox, and preference reversals, among others.1 A person seems unduly inXuenced by how a
gamble is framed, which violates a basic principle of rational choice which says preferences
should be invariant to how gambles are described.
Recent lab evidence suggests some of these individual lapses in rationality – deWned here
as consistent choices and preferences – can be corrected by the social discipline provided
by an active exchange institution like the market. To illustrate, consider the case of prefer-
ence reversals. A person reverses her preferences when she faces two lotteries of similar
expected value but diVerent risk, and she indicates a choice preference for the safer lottery
but states a value preference for the riskier bet (Irwin, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1993; Grether
& Plott, 1979; Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971).2 Results from lab experiments shows that once
this isolated person makes her choices within the social context of others who could exploit
the inconsistent decisions, she stops reversing her preferences (Berg, Dickhaut, & O’Brien,
1985; Chu & Chu, 1990). The research shows people quickly respond to the feedback and
discipline of an active exchange institution by adjusting their behavior to more closely
match rational choice theory.
Cherry, Crocker, and Shogren (2003) extends this result by showing the increased ratio-
nal behavior from the discipline of an exchange institution is not limited to the decisions
within that institution; rather the ampliWed rationality spills over to parallel decisions that
lack any discipline or exchange. They found that arbitrage not only stopped preference
reversals subject to the discipline of an exchange institution, but the discipline also stopped
preference reversals in a separate non-market setting in which the inconsistency did not
matter Wnancially. This so-called rationality spillovers phenomenon suggests the ability of
markets to induce rational behavior extends to behavior beyond the market, which has
implications for the elicitation of individual preferences and values in isolated and undisci-
plined settings (e.g., contingent valuation).3
Herein we follow up on Cherry et al. (2003) by investigating the presence of rationality
crossovers – when the rational behavior arising from an active exchange institution not
only spills over to isolated settings, but also crosses over to diVerent decisions. We examine
whether arbitrage in a preference reversal setting crosses over to induce people to exhibit
more rational behavior when indicating preferences over gambles and valuations of
reduced risks. Results corroborate previous Wndings of rationality spillovers, and extend
the literature by showing rationality crossovers exist in some, but not all cases. Arbitrage in
a preference reversal setting did crossover to impact isolated choices in related but distinct
tasks. Stated values for safer food dropped by 20–50% and the frequency of the Allais par-
adox is cut in half; whereas the frequency of the more distinct Ellsberg paradox remains
1 For good overviews, see Thaler (1992), Baron (2000), and Kahneman and Tversky (2000).
2 See Camerer’s (1995) review of the history and developments related to the preference reversal phenomenon.
3 Interestingly; Laury and Taylor (in press) Wnd some evidence of altruism spillovers in public good experiments.
exactly the same. The reach of exchange institutions to yield more rational choices is
shown to be longer than previously revealed, but it also has its limits.
In addition to exploring the reach of arbitrage, we also investigate whether a
weaker and less onerous form of arbitrage can provide similar eVects on behavior, includ-
ing rationality spillovers and rationality crossovers. Identifying less costly forms of correc-
tive arbitrage is crucial to harnessing the power of exchange institutions to yield
more rational choices in the elicitation of preferences and values in isolated non-market
settings. We Wnd the form of arbitrage may not need to be as cogent as previously studied;
a weaker form of arbitrage that only provides verbal feedback is shown to increase rational
choices at rates similar to the standard form of arbitrage entailing real Wnancial conse-
quences.
2. Preferences over gambles
We now describe the decision-making tasks in more detail. We Wrst discuss the prefer-
ence reversal phenomenon in the context of arbitrage (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971). We
then present the three crossover tasks we use to explore whether arbitrage over preference
reversals creates enough rationality to crossover to aVect behavior in other tasks. Each
crossover task provides a unique deviation from the preference reversal decisions of
choices and valuations: (I) the valuation of food safety, which involves the valuation of a
low probability/high severity lottery – no choices between lotteries (Shogren, Shin, Hayes,
& Kliebenstein, 1994); (II) the Allais paradox, which entails choices among two pairs of
lotteries – no valuation of lotteries (Allais, 1953); and (III) the Ellsberg paradox, which
involves a choice between a pair of two-outcome lotteries, one with ambiguous odds – no
valuation of lotteries (Ellsberg, 1961).
Preference reversals without and with arbitrage. The preference reversal phenomenon
arises when a person faces a pair of lotteries that have similar expected values but diVerent
levels of risk. For example, consider the following pair of lotteries: P-bet: p chance of $X,
and 1¡ p chance of $x and $-bet: q chance of $Y, and 1¡q chance of $y, where X > x,
Y > y, p > q, and Y > X. Expected utility theory presumes a person exhibits consistent
choices and valuations – a person values his most preferred lottery more than his least pre-
ferred lottery. Evidence, however, reveals this is not always the case. People reverse prefer-
ences by preferring one lottery to the other while valuing the most preferred lottery less
than the other lottery. The typical instance of preference reversal entails a person prefer-
ring the $-bet while placing a greater value on the p-bet. Many researchers have challenged
the persistence of the reversal phenomenon, only to show the depth of people’s irrational-
ity (e.g., Mowen & Gentry, 1980; Reilly, 1982).
One explanation of preference reversals is that people do not think about odds and con-
sequences simultaneously as expected utility requires. Rather people separate the two ele-
ments and make their decision based on the most attractive element – either more certain
odds or a very large prize, or the most like-minded element – $’s for $’s or %’s for %’s (see
for example March & Shapira, 1987; Tversky, Slovic, & Kahneman, 1990). People simplify
their choices by detaching probability from consequences and thinking about one element
at a time to make their decision. When a person does not frame the choice-valuation prob-
lem comprehensively as expected utility presumes and no mechanism exists to force a per-
son to reconsider the consequences of his irrational choice, his view on the relative
importance of probability and consequences aVects his decision.
Preference reversals are a powerful reminder that people sometimes behave in ways
rational choice theory does not predict. In economics, however, rationality is a social con-
struct not an individual phenomenon. Markets create rationality in the population by putt-
ing a cost on irrational behavior (Becker, 1962). People in marketlike settings have a
reason to be rational because rationality pays; people outside markets can aVord to be irra-
tional because others do not exploit their choices (e.g., Smith, 1991). As Machina (1997, p.
227) notes, “we should expect most of the testable implications of (the reasons for prefer-
ence reversals) to appear as cross-institutional predictions” (e.g., choices outside and within
marketlike settings). Results from several lab experiments shows that the rates of prefer-
ence reversals diVer across institutions. Reversals can be stopped once a person makes his
choices within the context of others who could exploit his inconsistent decisions, he stops
reversing his preferences (see Berg et al., 1985; Bohm, 1994; Bohm & Lind, 1993; Chu &
Chu, 1990; Cox & Grether, 1996). Preference reversals disappear once a person decides he
prefers more money to less.
Cherry et al. (2003) extended the notion of socialized rationality in the case of prefer-
ence reversals by showing that rationality spillovers exist – the rationality induced in a mar-
ketlike setting can transfer to decisions outside the marketlike environs. These spillovers
were robust even when people faced choices over hypothetical and environmental gambles.
In addition, and most importantly for our new experiments, the results show that people
did not change their preference ordering; rather they revised their stated values downward
for low-probability, high-severity lotteries. The observation that preferences remain stable
and stated values drop with marketlike experience suggests that rational choice theory is
robust.4 This result suggests that arbitrage caused people to curtail inXated expectations
about the value of risky lotteries, a result that has implications on whether rationality spill-
overs might crossover from preference reversals to the three other decision tasks we con-
sider next. Tasks that involve risky gambles – those that have low probabilities and large
outcomes – might be more likely to cause lapses in rationality, and therefore might be more
open to rationality crossover eVects.
Crossover task I: Food safety risks. For the Wrst crossover test, we consider the task of
valuing a low probability-high severity lottery – food borne pathogen illness. Evidence sug-
gests this is a relevant task since the preference reversal phenomenon has been documented
in non-monetary lotteries such as environmental and health risks (Irwin et al., 1993).
Crossover task I had people evaluate an objective food safety lottery, and then state their
willingness to pay for a reduction in the risk to life and limb. Following Shogren et al.
(1994), after receiving information on the food safety lottery as deWned by the objective
level of risk and illness outcome, people answered an open-ended willingness to pay ques-
tion:
Salmonella is a food-borne illness that entails 1–3 weeks of acute abdominal pains,
vomiting, diarrhea, and usually requires hospitalization. And 1 in 1000 people who
get Salmonella die. The risk of contracting Salmonella from a typical meal is 1 in
137,000. This per meal risk translates into an annual risk of 1 in 125 people. There is
food technology available that virtually eliminates this risk. In addition to the price
4 Gunnarsson, Shogren, and Cherry (2003) used panel regression methods to test explicitly whether average
preferences for skewness in risk were Wxed or fungible in the presence of arbitrage; they could not reject the
hypothesis of stable preferences.
of a typical meal, what is your maximum willingness to pay to virtually eliminate the
risk of Salmonella in a typical meal?
Previous laboratory evidence reports that people will actually pay a premium per meal
for such a risk reduction technology in the form of irradiation.5 Using a second-price auc-
tion, Shogren et al. (1999) found that consumers were willing to pay approximately $0.80
per chicken breast for safer food. Further, they found that nearly 80% of the laboratory
consumers preferred the irradiated chicken to the non-irradiated chicken; 30% of the con-
sumers were willing to pay a 10% premium; and 20% were willing to pay a 20% premium.
Note these results came from real exchanges in a repeated second-price auction with 10–15
bidders; our subjects here are answering a hypothetical food safety valuation question
without marketlike feedback. We anticipate these stated values will be inXated relative to
the earlier lab values due to hypothetical bias in bidding behavior (see Fox, Shogren,
Hayes, & Kliebenstein, 1998).
Food safety diVers from the preference reversal setting in two respects: there are no
choices over lotteries, just the valuation of a lottery; and a person values a compound lot-
tery – the odds of catching salmonella and surviving (1 in 125 times 999 in 1000) versus the
odds of death (1 in 125 times 1 in 1000). In the psychological structure of Goldstein and
Weber (1995), the food safety crossover task is similar to the preference reversal design.
Since arbitrage over preference reversals caused people to adjust their stated values for
gambles and not their choices between gambles, the valuation task should provide the best
chance for a rationality crossover, even if the gamble is a compound lottery.
Crossover task II: Allais paradox. Allais’ (1953) classic experiment revealed people rou-
tinely violate the independence axiom used to construct expected-utility theory. According
to the independence axiom, if a person prefers lottery A to lottery B, that person prefers the
probability mixture A + (1¡ )Z to B + (1¡)Z for all  > 0 and Z. Intuitively, the inde-
pendence axiom says that a person’s choice between two options depends only on the
states of nature in which those options yield diVerent results. Allais’ counterexample used
the following two pairs of choices:
Allais Wrst asked people to compare and choose their preferred lottery between A or B,
and next he had them indicate a preference between C or D. If the independence axiom
holds, a person who selected A should then pick D (or, if his Wrst choice was B, his second
choice should be C). To be consistent, a person who prefers a certain $1 million (A) to a
10% chance to win $5 million (B), should also prefer the 11% chance of $1 million (D) to
the 10% chance of $5 million (C). But among his subjects, Allais observed many chose A
5 Shogren, Fox, Hayes, and Roosen (1999) observed the willingness to pay for irradiation is statistically equiva-
lent whether the technology is identiWed; we therefore did not identify the risk reduction technology in the state-
ment and question.
1. Choose between (A) and (B):
(A) 100% chance of $1 million (B) 10% chance of $5 million,
89% chance of $1 million,
and a 1% chance of zero dollars
2. Choose between (C) and (D):
(C) 10% chance of $5 million, (D) 11% chance of $1 million,
and a 90% chance of zero dollars and a 89% chance of zero dollars
and C – the certain outcome and the risky lottery. People like certainty but they are willing
to give up 1% point to go for the $5 million prize, even if it implies irrational choice in the
sense of inconsistent risk preferences. Many other studies have since replicated the Allais
Wndings (see Camerer, 1995).
Again the Allais setting has a similar essential structure, but diVers from the preference
reversal setting in one respect – there are no valuation decisions, just choices over lotteries.
If people adjust stated values not choices between gambles, this diVerence may inhibit the
ability of preference-reversal-arbitrage to induce rational behavior in the Allais setting.
Arbitrage that causes people to stop reversing preferences by adjusting valuation decisions
might not aVect choices between lotteries, if valuation is not considered. But if the rational-
ity crossover aVects a person at a more fundamental level, these low probability-high out-
come lotteries might well look less attractive. Our a priori expectation is that rationality
crossovers will reduce the frequency of the Allais choice task, but the impact will be less
robust relative to the food safety valuation task.
Crossover task III: Ellsberg paradox. Ellsberg (1961) demonstrated that people are
averse to ambiguous probabilities, another violation of expected utility theory. Ellsberg
obtained his results by asking people to choose between two probability distributions in a
lottery; one of which was known and the other was ambiguous. People usually chose the
known distribution even though the ambiguous distribution had a higher expected utility.
The Ellsberg paradox suggests most people will usually avoid the ambiguous risk.
Consider the following example. Two urns contain a large number of red and black
balls. Urn A is known to contain 50 red balls and 50 black balls. Urn B contains red and
black balls in unknown proportions. Suppose a person wins $100 if we draw the color ball
of her choice from of the urns. Which urn do most people select to draw from? Most peo-
ple prefer Urn A with known odds to Urn B with ambiguous odds, even though they do
not care whether they go for a red ball or a black ball in Urn B. This indiVerence suggests
that people’s subjective odds are 50:50 in the ambiguous Urn B, the same as the objective
odds in Urn A. This violates expected utility theory in that the decision weights assigned to
diVerent states of the world should be independent of the origin of the uncertainty.
The Ellsberg setting deviates from the preference reversal framework in two respects:
there are no valuation decisions and the choice decisions involve ambiguous risk rather
than risky lotteries. The question again is whether preference-reversal-arbitrage in which
people adjust values for risky lotteries, not preferences, will impact how people choose
in the Ellsberg setting. Given the substantial deviation from the preference reversal
framework and the lack of risky lottery comparisons, we expect fewer instances of ratio-
nality crossovers for the Ellsberg paradox relative to the Allais paradox and food safety
valuation.
3. Experimental design
We designed a three-stage experiment involving the presented decision tasks with and
without forms of arbitrage. We recruited 166 subjects from introductory and intermediate
economics classes at the University of Wyoming. Each subject was inexperienced with spe-
ciWc decision tasks they were given, and each participated in only one treatment. All treat-
ments were pencil and paper sessions, and took between 30 and 60 min to complete.
Consider now the speciWcs of our three treatments – real arbitrage (nD54), cheap talk arbi-
trage (nD61), and for control purposes we also conduct a no-arbitrage baseline (nD 51).
Real arbitrage. For the real arbitrage treatment, the monitor recruited subjects to partic-
ipate in individual one-on-one sessions over a 4-day period. In stage one, subjects were
asked to answer a set of four decision-making tasks: preference reversal, food safety risk,
Allais paradox, and Ellsberg paradox. Stage two provided subjects experience with arbi-
trage in the preference reversal framework. In stage three, subjects faced the same four
decision-making tasks in the same order as they faced in stage one, but with diVerent
parameter values for the lotteries to avoid perfunctory learning of each task.
The arbitrage mechanism follows earlier work on preference reversals (e.g., Chu & Chu,
1990). After completing the Wrst set of tasks in stage one, subjects participated in real
exchanges with a monitor. After being endowed with $7, each subject individually faced a
pair of lotteries that Wt the preference reversal framework and had to indicate their pre-
ferred lottery and their fair value for each lottery. If the subject indicated consistent prefer-
ences and values, he purchased a lottery if his indicated value exceeded a randomly
determined oVer price.6
If the subject reversed his preferences, the monitor conducted the three exchanges to
arbitrage the subject’s inconsistent responses. The subjects were told that the monitor
would buy, sell and/or trade with him only if it is beneWcial to the monitor. Each subject
knows the monitor will only do the following three exchanges: (1) buy when the monitor’s
‘reservation value’ for an option is greater than or equal to the subject’s indicated ‘fair
value’ for that option; (2) sell when the monitor’s ‘reservation value’ for an option is lower
than or equal to the subject’s indicated ‘fair value’ for that option; and (3) trade when the
monitor’s most preferred option is the subject’s least preferred option. The monitor’s ‘res-
ervation value’ and ‘preferences’ are determined randomly. Three rolls of a single die deter-
mine the monitor’s reservation value – one for each digit of the value. The value ranged
between $1.11 and $6.66.
The arbitrage process was repeated with diVerent lottery pairs until the subject indicated
consistent preferences and values for the presented lotteries, when he was allowed to pur-
chase a lottery depending on the indicated fair value and the randomly determined oVer
price. Subjects indicated consistent preferences and values within 3 rounds, with two excep-
tions requiring 4 and 6 rounds. Subject earnings consisted of a $15 participation fee and
any payoVs received from the arbitrage session. This concluded the arbitrage session. Each
subject then answered the second set of decision-making tasks in stage three.
Cheap-talk arbitrage. The cheap-talk arbitrage treatment is identical to the real arbi-
trage treatment, except that arbitrage is now just cheap talk – the “non-binding communi-
cation of actions by two or more players in an experiment prior to their hypothetical
commitment” (Cummings & Taylor, 1999, p. 650).7 Our motivation comes from Cummings
and Taylor (1999), who argue integrating a cheap talk script directly into a valuation
survey can improve the ex ante validity of stated preference results.8 They show that
6 While recognizing its limits in demand revelation (e.g., Bohm, Johan, & Joakim, 1997), we used a variation of
the Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1964) (BDM) mechanism to improve the correspondence between the sub-
ject’s indicated values and true values. We hold the BDM mechanism constant across treatments.
7 The use of “cheap talk” in non-market valuation diVers from the usual game theory use, in which the “talk” is
between the players in the game. Here the “talk” is between the monitor and the subject. Both uses refer to the
costless, non-binding, non-veriWable form of communication sent prior to actual play (e.g., Farrell, 1987).
8 Peter Bohm raised the open question of whether arbitrage was a necessary condition for more rational choices
or whether explaining the arbitrage process to subjects would be a suYcient condition to generate consistent
behavior.
hypothetical willingness to pay values for public goods drop signiWcantly toward real val-
ues once people are explicitly told via a cheap talk script that most people have a tendency
to overstate hypothetical values.
Here we examine whether cheap talk arbitrage can have a similar impact on irrational
behavior. By considering cheap talk, we create a weaker form of arbitrage than the strict
no preference-reversal-left-unpunished real arbitrage treatment. This allows us to create a
range of arbitrage – strict to weak – that brackets more intermediary forms of arbitrage
that might be found in the wilds.
In the cheap talk treatment, we followed the Wrst stage with an explanation of how irra-
tional behavior could be costly. Subjects did not purchase lotteries, the monitor did not use
actual arbitrage to money pump irrational subjects, and they did not exchange money. We
used a hypothetical illustration on how someone who reverses his preference could be
impacted by arbitrage.9 After the cheap talk session, subjects answered the second set of
decision-making tasks in stage three. Given the hypothetical nature, subject earnings con-
sisted of a Xat $15 participation fee. If the cheap talk arbitrage is successful in reducing
anomalous behavior relative to actual arbitrage, it supports the idea that a reasonable low
cost method exists to increase the consistency of choices and stated values of survey
respondents asked to think about gambles.
No-arbitrage baseline. The baseline treatment was conducted to disentangle potential
confounding eVects that may lead to behavioral changes between stage one and stage three,
e.g., learning. This treatment eliminates any arbitrage in stage two; thereby providing a
clean illustration of the impact of arbitrage. As in the other treatments, each subject was
asked to answer the same sets of four decision-making tasks in stages one and three. Stage
two left oV the arbitrage experience; there was only a pause to indicate two distinct periods.
As in the cheap talk treatment, subjects were paid $15 for participating in the session.
4. Hypotheses
We test three sets of hypotheses – the real arbitrage hypotheses to examine whether arbi-
trage in the preference reversal framework can crossover to other tasks; the cheap talk
hypotheses to explore whether the weak cheap-talk arbitrage is a viable substitute for the
strict real arbitrage; and the no-arbitrage baseline hypotheses to isolate the impact of arbi-
trage by testing for changing behavior in the absence of arbitrage. Table 1 summarizes our
3£ 4 experimental design and sets of hypotheses.
Denoting the mean value and rate of irrational behavior as (·), we test the null of
equality between subjects’ behavior before and after arbitrage – HO: (pre)D(post). If
the experience of arbitrage over preference reversals has a signiWcant impact on the behav-
ior of the four other tasks, we should reject the null in favor of less irrational behavior after
arbitrage – HA: (pre) > (post). Testing this hypothesis for each of the four tasks yields
four tests per treatment.
9 The monitor provided a pair of lotteries and asked each subject to consider which lottery he or she preferred
and his or her reservation value for each lottery. The monitor stated the cheap-talk script: “people sometimes
indicate inconsistent preferences and values, which may cause them to lose money in a real setting. The loss of
money could occur by a person buying the lower-valued, but most-preferred, lottery for your reservation price,
then trading this most-preferred lottery for your least-preferred lottery, and then sell your least-preferred, but
highest-valued, lottery to you for your reservation price”. Subjects were then asked to reconsider their preferences
and values.
Real arbitrage hypotheses. We initially re-examine previous reports that arbitrage over
preference reversals will cause people to rethink their behavior and eliminate reversals (H1:
real direct hypothesis). The Wrst test of rationality crossovers is undertaken by examining
whether arbitrage over preference reversals impacts the valuation behavior of people
assessing a reduction in the risk of food borne pathogens (H2: real crossover I hypothesis).
Subsequent tests examine whether rationality crossovers impact the choice-based behavior
over certain lotteries in the Allais paradox (H3: real crossover II hypothesis) and ambiguous
lotteries in the Ellsberg paradox (H4: real crossover III hypothesis).
Cheap talk hypotheses. Exploring the weaker cheap talk arbitrage, we Wrst examine
whether such arbitrage has an impact on behavior in the same preference reversal context
(H5: cheap talk direct hypothesis). We then test whether cheap talk arbitrage in the prefer-
ence reversal setting impacts valuation behavior of food safety (H6: cheap talk crossover I
hypothesis) and choice-base behavior over certain lotteries in the Allais paradox (H7: cheap
talk crossover II hypothesis) and ambiguous lotteries in the Ellsberg paradox (H8: cheap
talk crossover III hypothesis).
Baseline hypotheses. Given our within-treatment analysis, we replicated the tests on data
from a non-arbitrage baseline treatment to ensure any behavioral changes resulted from
the arbitrage experience rather than other confounding factors such as learning. If we
reject the null baseline hypotheses (HBi, iD 1, 2, 3, 4), increased rationality may be attribut-
able to these confounding factors. If we fail to reject the baseline hypotheses, we will be
more conWdent that real and cheap-talk arbitrage caused any observed decline in irrational
behavior.
5. Results
Our key result shows that arbitrage-induced rationality can transfer across tasks.
Table 2 provides a summary of pre- and post-arbitrage behavior by task and treatment.
We Wrst consider the real arbitrage treatment.
Real arbitrage. The results illustrate how real arbitrage can aVect behavior, both stated
values and preference ordering. After experiencing arbitrage in the preference reversal
framework, the rate of preference reversals decreased signiWcantly – rejecting the real direct
hypothesis (pD 0.0006; Fisher’s exact test, FET). Table 2 shows that prior to experiencing
arbitrage the rate of preference reversals was 37% and afterwards the rate drop to 9%. This
aggregate decline is consistent with earlier Wndings in Chu and Chu (1990) and Cherry
et al. (2003), in which reversals fell to between 3% and 8% from around 30% to 40%.
Table 3 presents more detailed results by grouping people into one of four categories:
rational change (yes–no), rational no change (no–no), irrational no change (yes–yes), and
Table 1
Summary of experimental design and hypotheses
Task Treatment
Real arbitrage Cheap-talk arbitrage Baseline – no arbitrage
Preference reversal H1: real direct H5: cheap-talk direct HB1: direct
Allais paradox H2: real crossover I H6: cheap-talk crossover I HB2: crossover I
Ellsberg paradox H3: real crossover II H7: cheap-talk crossover II HB3: crossover II
Food safety valuation H4: real crossover III H8: cheap-talk crossover III HB4: crossover III
irrational change (no–yes). The categories indicate how subject behavior changed across the
pre- and post-arbitrage stage. For instance, for the rational change cell, a “(yes–no)” means
that “yes”, a person reversed his preferences in the pre-arbitrage stage; but then “no”, he
did not reverse his preference in the post-arbitrage stage. Table 3 reports that 30% (16 of
54) of all subjects fell into the “yes–no” rational change category. Considering only those
that reversed preferences in the pre-arbitrage stage, 80% (16 of 20) corrected preferences
after having experienced real arbitrage. Further investigation reveals that in 69% (11 of 16)
Table 2
Incidents and values of irrational behavior by task pre- and post-arbitrage treatment a,b
a Standard deviations reported in parentheses.
b 9 and Ð indicate the rejection of the null (HO: (pre)D(post)) at the 5% and 1% levels for one-tailed tests.
Task Real arbitrage (n D 54) Cheap talk arbitrage (n D 61) No arbitrage baseline (nD 51)
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Preference
reversal (%)
37.0 9.3Ð 23.0 4.9Ð 43.1 39.2
(0.487) (0.293) (0.424) (0.218) (0.500) (0.493)
Food safety
valuation ($)
$6.89 Mean $5.629 Mean $5.97 Mean $4.779 Mean $6.83 Mean $6.66 Mean
$4.00 Median $3.00 Median $3.00 Median $2.00 Median $3.75 Median $4.00 Median
(8.02) (6.41) (7.97) (6.69) (8.62) (8.15)
Allais
paradox (%)
74.1 51.9Ð 67.2 45.9Ð 70.6 64.7
(0.442) (0.504) (0.473) (0.502) (0.460) (0.483)
Ellsberg
paradox (%)
79.6 72.2 77.1 77.1 78.4 82.4
(0.407) (0.452) (0.424) (0.424) (0.415) (0.385)
Table 3
Individual behavior types by task and treatment
Task Treatment
Real arbitrage Cheap talk arbitrage No arbitrage baseline
Preference reversal
% (#) Rational change (yes–no) 29.6 (16) 18.0 (11) 7.8 (4)
% (#) Rational no change (no–no) 61.1 (33) 77.1 (47) 52.9 (27)
% (#) Irrational no change (yes–yes) 7.4 (4) 4.9 (3) 35.3 (18)
% (#) Irrational change (no–yes) 1.9 (1) 0.0 (0) 3.9 (2)
Total 100.0 (54) 100.0 (61) 100.0 (51)
Allais paradox
% (#) Rational change (yes–no) 25.9 (14) 23.0 (14) 9.8 (5)
% (#) Rational no change (no–no) 22.2 (12) 31.2 (19) 25.5 (13)
% (#) Irrational no change (yes–yes) 48.2 (26) 44.3 (27) 60.8 (31)
% (#) Irrational change (no–yes) 3.9 (2) 1.6 (1) 3.9 (2)
Total 100.0 (54) 100.0 (61) 100.0 (51)
Ellsberg paradox
% (#) Rational change (yes–no) 13.0 (7) 3.3 (2) 2.0 (1)
% (#) Rational no change (no–no) 14.8 (8) 19.7 (12) 15.7 (8)
% (#) Irrational no change (yes–yes) 66.6 (36) 73.8 (45) 76.5 (39)
% (#) Irrational change (no–yes) 5.6 (3) 3.3 (2) 5.9 (3)
Total 100.0 (54) 100.0 (61) 100.0 (51)
of the rational change cases, subjects corrected reversals by revising downward their valua-
tion of the high-risk lottery.
This Wnding corresponds with the previous lab research that shows arbitrage induces
people to act more rationally, and does so by inducing them to adjust values for the high-
risk option downward rather than by changing preference ordering. People did not change
their preference ordering for real, hypothetical, or environmental lotteries once they were
arbitraged (see Cherry et al., 2003). Preference mutation was not the reason for acting more
rationally nor was the upward revision of stated values for low-risk lotteries; rather they
revised their stated values for high-risk lotteries downward. Our results conWrm this pat-
tern – people exposed to arbitrage adjust their statements of value to better reXect their
preferences, rather than changing their preferences to the context.
Tversky et al. (1990) note the overpricing of the high-risk options was the reason for
about two-thirds of the preference reversals observed in their experiments. Rather than a
fundamental intransitivity in preferences, many people simply overpriced the high-risk
option. Tversky et al. (1990) explained the overpricing result ex post by coining the “com-
patibility eVect” or “contingent weighting”, in which the weighting of stimulus (inputs) is
enhanced by the compatibility with the response (output). For example, a person asked to
state a $-value for a gamble will focus more on the compatible element of the stimulus –
the $-value of the win or loss, than he will on the incompatible element – the %-probability
of winning. This suggests he overprices a high-risk option because he concentrates on the
dollar outcomes of the gamble, not the odds of winning the gamble. While the compatibil-
ity eVect might explain the initial behavior, our results show the eVect does not seem partic-
ularly robust once arbitrage is introduced into the decision frame. Our results suggest any
compatibility eVect fades away once individual behavior is subject to social exchange such
as arbitrage.
We now address the question of whether the rationality induced by arbitrage in the
preference reversal setting spills over to the other three tasks – valuing safer food, Allais
gambles, and Ellsberg ambiguous urns. First consider the valuation task. Recall, since sub-
jects generally respond to arbitrage in the preference reversal setting by adjusting stated
values, the task of valuing safer food may be the crossover task most susceptible to any
rationality crossover eVect. Table 2 reports the mean stated value for food safety risk
reduction decreased 18.4% after subjects experienced real arbitrage. Mean stated values
dropped from a pre-arbitrage value of $6.89 to a post-arbitrage value of $5.62. The median
value also declined – from $4 to $3. A paired test Wnds the mean pre- and post-arbitrage
stated values are signiWcantly diVerent – rejecting the real crossover I null hypothesis
(tD2.52; pD 0.0075) and indicating a signiWcant rationality crossover eVect on valuations
for safer food.10
We now consider the Allais paradox. Since people’s preferences seem relatively stable,
the prospects for rationality crossovers to aVect the incidence of the Allais paradox may be
lower. Table 2 however indicates that rationality crossovers do exist to some degree in the
10 We note the post-arbitrage hypothetical values are high relative to the Hayes, Shogren, Shin, and Kliebenstein
(1995) lab valuation experiments that elicited real economic commitments to reduce the risks of Salmonella, in
which the average lab participant paid approximately $0.70 per meal using a Vickrey second-price auction. Even
so, given these are open-ended hypothetical statements of value, we put more weight on the relative values than
the absolute values. We Wnd 54% of subjects reduced their stated values after arbitrage; compared to 19% that in-
creased their stated values after arbitrage.
Allais framework. The proportion of people who fell prey to the Allais paradox signiW-
cantly decreased after facing real arbitrage in the preference reversal setting – rejecting the
real crossover II hypothesis (pD 0.0139, FET). The incident rate of the Allais paradox was
74.1% prior to arbitrage, but dropped to 51.9% after subjects experienced real arbitrage
with preference reversals. We acknowledge that the rationality crossovers phenomenon did
not eliminate all occurrences of the Allais paradox,11 but it did signiWcantly reduce the rate
of the inconsistent choices beyond any evidence that currently exists in the literature.
Again, Table 3 provides more details by reporting the type of behavioral changes
observed across the pre- and post-arbitrage stages. About 26% (14 of 54) of all subjects
corrected initial inconsistencies in the Allais framework after experiencing real arbitrage
with preference reversals. Considering only those with initial inconsistent choices prior to
arbitrage, 35% (14 of 40) of subjects corrected their initial inconsistencies after arbitrage
while the remaining 65% (26 of 40) did not.
To better understand this result, Table 4 reports the speciWc choice adjustments related
to the decreased incidence of the Allais paradox. The table provides the rates of behavior
for the four possible choice categories in the Allais framework before and after the arbi-
trage session. With our parameters, rational choices are A and D or B and C; irrational
choices are A and C or B and D. Of the 74.1% of subjects indicating irrational choices prior
to arbitrage, 61.1% exhibited the typical paradoxical behavior of choosing lotteries A and
C. After arbitrage, this number declined to 42.6%. With the rate of choosing A and D dou-
bling after arbitrage, subjects seem to have adjusted preferences by switching from an A
and C choice to A and D. The observed behavior suggests people became more risk averse
from their experience with arbitrage because the correcting behavior appears to arise from
11 While tests between pre- and post-arbitrage behavior reveal signiWcant treatment eVects, tests between post-
arbitrage and predicted behavior suggest the remaining irrational behavior is non-trivial.
Table 4
Rate of preferred lotteries pre and post arbitrage in Allais frameworka
a Rational choices in the Allais paradox are either (A and D) or (B and C).
Pre-arbitrage Post-arbitrage
C D Total C D Total
Real arbitrage
A 61.1 20.4 81.5 42.6 40.7 83.3
B 5.6 13.0 18.6 7.4 9.3 16.7
Total 66.7 33.4 100.0 50.0 50.0 100.0
Cheap talk arbitrage
A 55.7 26.2 81.9 37.7 44.3 82.0
B 6.6 11.5 18.1 9.8 8.2 18.0
Total 62.3 37.7 100.0 47.5 52.5 100.0
No arbitrage baseline
A 64.7 19.6 84.3 60.8 23.5 84.3
B 9.8 5.9 15.7 11.8 3.9 15.7
Total 74.5 25.5 100.0 72.6 27.4 100.0
subjects adjusting the more risky C–D choice rather than the more certain A–B choice.
Subjects stayed with the certain choice A, and then adjusted their preferences away from
the high risk C choice to the lower risk D choice.
This behavioral response corresponds to that observed in the preference reversal case. In
both cases, arbitraged subjects who made a rational change did so by altering how they
react to the high-risk choices – lowering their stated values for high-risk lotteries in the pref-
erence reversal setting and switching their preference ordering away from high-risk lotteries
in the Allais paradox setting. Risk aversion and high-risk lotteries may be the catalyst for
rationality crossovers. Many people experiencing arbitrage of preference reversals reacted
by reducing their stated value for low probability food safety threats and switching prefer-
ences away from low probability-high outcome gambles that originally attracted them.
We now turn to the last crossover task, the Ellsberg paradox. While the Ellsberg frame-
work remains a choice-based setting, it introduces ambiguity to the decision frame. The
distinction between risk and ambiguity causes the prospects for rationality crossovers to be
even lower. Indeed, results reported in Table 2 reveal no signiWcant rationality crossover
eVect with regard to the Ellsberg paradox. Rates of inconsistent choices in the Ellsberg set-
ting do not signiWcantly diVer between pre- and post-arbitrage stages – failing to reject the
real crossover II hypothesis (pD 0.250, FET). Turning to individual data, Table 3 reports
that only 13% (7 of 54) of subjects corrected their initial inconsistent Ellsberg choice after
experiencing arbitrage with preference reversals. Among those subjects making inconsis-
tent choices prior to arbitrage, only 16% corrected their inconsistent choices after arbitrage
while the remaining 84% repeated their inconsistent choices. Results indicate the rational-
ity crossover phenomenon has its limits and rationality learning from arbitraged prefer-
ence reversals may not crossover to isolated settings involving ambiguous lotteries. The
gap between high risk and ambiguous risk seems to impede learning across tasks.
Cheap talk arbitrage. Given the direct and crossover eVects, we now test whether cheap-
talk arbitrage is a viable substitute to real arbitrage. Observed behavior from the prefer-
ence reversal framework suggests the weaker cheap-talk arbitrage induces people to act
more rationally to a similar degree as the stricter real arbitrage. Table 2 shows that cheap-
talk arbitrage signiWcantly reduced the rate of preference reversals from 23.0% to 4.9% –
rejecting the cheap-talk direct null (pD0.0037, FET). This 79% decrease in reversal rates
corresponds closely to the 75% drop observed with real arbitrage. Table 3 shows that
among those subjects that initially reversed preferences, the proportion of subjects that
corrected their reversals after experiencing arbitrage was similar across the cheap-talk and
real arbitrage treatments – 78.6% (11 of 14) versus 80% (16 of 20). As before, people who
switched to rational decisions did so by lowering stated values rather than changing prefer-
ence orderings (7 of 11 subjects).
The potential for hypothetical arbitrage to replace real arbitrage as a motivating force
for people acting more rationally is noteworthy. This suggests that monitors of isolated
surveys can induce people to exhibit more rational choices by explaining arbitrage to
respondents individually or as a group, without having to undertake a more costly individ-
ual-level money pump process of actually taking lotteries and money.
Now consider whether cheap-talk arbitrage yields any rationality crossovers to the three
other tasks. Table 2 shows the rationality crossover eVects observed with cheap talk arbi-
trage are similar to those with real arbitrage. Cheap talk arbitrage crosses over to impact
food safety valuation with people signiWcantly lowered their stated willingness to pay –
rejecting the cheap talk crossover I hypothesis (tD 2.44; pD 0.0088). Mean stated values
with cheap-talk arbitrage declined signiWcantly from $5.97 to $4.77, while median fell from
$3.00 to $2.00. The declines in both measures correspond closely to those observed in the
real arbitrage treatment.
Cheap talk arbitrage also reduced the incidence of the Allais paradox from 67% to 46%,
rejecting the cheap-talk crossover II null (pD 0.0140, FET). The 31.3% drop in incidence
rates with cheap-talk arbitrage nearly matches the 30% decline observed with real arbi-
trage. Table 3 reveals 23.0% of subjects made a rational change in the cheap-talk arbitrage
treatment, which compares well to the 25.9% of subjects that did so in the real arbitrage
treatment. Table 4 provides the behavioral matrices for the cheap talk arbitrage treatment.
As with the real arbitrage treatment, the majority of subjects exhibiting irrational choices
prior to arbitrage chose A and C, 55.7%. But after cheap talk arbitrage, the percent of sub-
jects choosing A and C fell to 37.7%, while the number of subjects choosing A and D nearly
doubled. Just as in the real arbitrage treatment, subjects tended to correct their paradoxical
choices by switching away from C to D while staying with A. Again we did not eliminate
irrational behavior, but we do observe more rational behavior at both poles, A and D and
B and C, after exposure to either the strict real or weak cheap talk arbitrage.
As with real arbitrage, the crossover ability of cheap-talk arbitrage failed to extend to
the choice task involving ambiguous lotteries. Observed behavior within the Ellsberg para-
dox framework before and after the cheap-talk arbitrage did not diVer at the aggregate
level – failing to reject the cheap-talk crossover II hypothesis (pD0.5851, FET). Table 3
indicates that only 3.3% of subjects made a rational change in the cheap-talk arbitrage
treatment.
Comparison to the observed baseline. Finally, we verify that the observed changes in
behavior arose from arbitrage and not from other confounding factors by providing a no-
arbitrage baseline comparison for the arbitrage treatments. Table 2 shows that the baseline
choices were similar across the two sets of tasks in the absence of arbitrage. Tests fail to
reject the null of equality for the food safety valuation task (tD0.395; pD0.35) and the
four choice tasks: preference reversal (pD0.42), Allais paradox (pD0.34), and Ellsberg
paradox (pD0.40). As Table 3 reports, only 7.8% (4 of 51) of baseline subjects made a
rational change in the preference reversal setting, which contrasts with the 29.6%
and 18.0% of subjects that did so in the real and cheap talk treatments. For the Allais para-
dox, 9.8% (5 of 51) made a rational change in the absence of arbitrage, which diVers from
the 25.9% and 23.0% of subjects making a rational change with real and cheap talk arbi-
trage.
Turning to the behavioral matrices in Table 4, we see the systematic behavior adjust-
ments observed for Allais with arbitrage did not occur in the no-arbitrage baseline. The ini-
tial rates of choices over the lottery pairs are similar to those observed in the Wrst stage of
the arbitrage treatments, but unlike those treatments the behavior pattern does not signiW-
cantly change in the post-arbitrage stage. For example, the rate of the typical Allais behav-
ior (choosing A and C) is 64.7% in the initial stage and 60.8% in the last stage. Subjects
stayed with A, and rarely adjusted their choice between C and D. These comparisons sug-
gest that confounding factors did not play a signiWcant role in our rationality crossover
Wndings. Arbitrage, real or hypothetical, seems to be the driving force behind the signiW-
cant increase in rational choices observed in the lab.
Two caveats are worth addressing at this point. First, the real and cheap talk arbitrage
money pumps bracket the range of potential arbitrage in the wilds. As in Chu and
Chu (1990), with the real money pump, no preference reversal escaped its reach, which
represents an aggressive marketlike environment. In contrast, our cheap talk money pump
simply discusses the general idea of arbitrage and its consequences, which represents a
weak marketlike environment. Our results show similar behavior at both poles – people
acted more rationally once arbitrage was introduced, either for real or in theory. Given
similar behavior at the extremes, one can speculate that these results might remain robust
to more intermediary forms of arbitrage found in the wilds, but this is an open question
worthy of future research.
Second, the arbitrage mechanism may or may not have made people become more
rational. We did not prove people think more rationally with arbitrage; rather we observed
people acting more rationally. While more rational thinking might have been induced, peo-
ple could have acted more rationally for countless behavioral reasons – arbitrage might
have caused them to be more conservative, less capricious, and so on. Our goal is to explore
the power that an institution posses to induce people to act more rationally or to act as if
they were more rational, regardless of whether their thinking was more rational in the tra-
ditional expected utility sense.12
6. Conclusions
Tversky and Kahneman (2000, p. 223) contend “[t]he claim that the market can be
trusted to correct the eVect of individual irrationalities cannot be made without supporting
evidence, and the burden of specifying a plausible corrective mechanism should rest on
those who make the claim”. We agree. Our results provide evidence to show that arbitrage-
induced rationality can transfer across contexts. We Wnd evidence that such rationality
crossovers can exist for preferences over gambles: arbitrage in one setting can induce peo-
ple to exhibit more rational behavior in another distinct setting. The idea of a rationality
crossovers relates to a point made in the psychology literature about “generalization” or
“transfer” – people with training can transfer what they learned in one context to judg-
ments framed in another context because they can avoid the behavior that was punished in
the Wrst setting (see for example Nisbett, Fong, Lehman, & Cheng, 1987). Our use of gam-
bles as stimuli follows earlier work that says, “generalizability is enhanced by studying
decision making in its ‘essential’ form” (Goldstein & Weber, 1995, p. 84). And while some
psychologists might perceive simpliWed marketlike arbitrage as a “harsh penalty” solution
that reveals the economist’s “defensive posture” about the reversal phenomena (Slovic,
2000, p. 493, 494), our Wndings support the idea that “generalization” exists in economic
contexts too. If the experimenter can show a person that his instinctual behavior is costly,
she can induce him to behave in a less instinctive manner. Some evidence exists in the psy-
chology literature that when people are trained to think harder about the normative princi-
ple underlying a decision problem, some people, but not all, are more likely to behave in
accordance with the principle, causing behavioral anomalies to disappear (see Slovic &
Tversky, 1974, discussion of their understanding/acceptance principle). This suggests that
12 The data, while limiting, indicate the observed increase in rational choices is not randomly distributed among
subjects, suggesting that arbitrage aVects choices across settings for some subjects, but not others. For instance, in
the real arbitrage treatment, 72% of rational changes in all settings were made by 41% of subjects while 26% of
subjects made no rational change in any setting. More speciWcally, of the 16 subjects that made a rational change
in the preference reversal setting, seven made a rational change in at least two of three other settings, and only one
failed to make a rational change in at least one other setting.
more understanding about the cause and eVect of a choice pushes behavior toward more
consistent responses, a Wnding supported by the decision experiments in Stanovich and
West (1998). As our experiment shows, people act more rationally and this behavior trans-
ferred to other related tasks. More generally, the evidence supports the notion that eco-
nomic rationality should be considered a social not an isolated construct (Smith, 1991).
Even more notably, the idea of a rationality crossover advances our understanding
about rationality training – arbitrage in one task can crossover and inXuence behavior in
other tasks. This rationality crossover eVect was the strongest for valuation of low proba-
bility-high severity food safety and the Allais paradox. But as the experiment also showed,
the ability to induce people to act more rationally has its limits. The Ellsberg paradox, with
its complex context, was unaVected by the rationality training. Finally, the evidence that
cheap-talk arbitrage could serve a viable substitute for real arbitrage to induce people to
exhibit more rational behavior, both for rationality spillovers and crossovers is notewor-
thy. People acted more rationally after being exposed to a simple explanation of arbitrage
and its consequences. Strict real arbitrage that punished each and every inconsistency was
unnecessary.
While arbitrage – real or cheap-talk – did not eliminate irrationality in all choices and
all people, our results show that rationality from arbitrage can spillover settings and cross-
over tasks and lead to stated values and preferences that are signiWcantly more consistent.
Future eVorts should continue to explore and identify more robust methods of arbitrage in
the lab and in Weld non-valuation work.
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